The hidden costs of ethnic conflict - decomposing trends in educational outcomes of young Kosovars by Alva, Soumya et al.
tvps  Joso
POLICY  RESEARCH  WORKING  PAPER  28 80
The Hidden Costs of Ethnic Conflict






Europe and Central Asia Region

















































































































dI  POLICY  RESEARCH  WORKING  PAPER  2880
Abstract
Alva,  Murrugarra,  and Paci examine the impact of ethnic  system. To disentangle the effects  of the changing system
segmentation  in education on educational  outcomes.  and economic environment,  and the changes  in the
Between  1991  and the  late 1990s, the Albanian  Kosovar  characteristics of the population, a Oaxaca-type
population  received education  services  in an  informal  decomposition  is used.
system parallel  to the official one. Using the 2000  The results suggest that the past decade of ethnic
Kosovo LSMS Survey data, the authors  exploit cohort  tension has claimed a substantial toll on  the educational
differences in exposure to the parallel system  to estimate  outcomes of young male Albanian  Kosovars.  In addition
its effects among Albanian  youth. The first (untreated)  to declines  in enrollment rates in secondary education,
cohort includes  individuals who entered secondary  those who are enrolled  are expected to complete  one less
education before  1991 when the "parallel"  education  year of education.  However, secondary school
system was initiated. The second  (treated)  cohort  enrollment for girls increased  during the parallel system,
includes individuals  who entered secondary school  in the  but with a sharp decline  in the expected  number  of years
last ten years under the ethnically  segmented  education  completed.
This paper-a product of the Human Development Sector Unit, Europe and Central Asia Region-is part of a larger effort
in the region to examine  poverty and social service delivery  issues. Copies of the paper are available free from the World
Bank,  1818 H Street NW, Washington, DC 20433. Please contact Theresa Bebli, room H7-114, telephone 202-473-9690,
fax 202-477-0574,  email  address tbebli@worldbank.org.  Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at
http://econ.worldbank.org.  The  authors  may  be  contacted  at  salva@unc.edu,  emurrugarra@worldbank.org,  or
ppaci@worldbank.org.  August 2002.  (31  pages)
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Economists'  Forum in May 2001  are appreciated.1. Introduction
In 1948, Kosovo was among the poorest regions of the newly established Socialist
Former Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) in more than one dimension.  Agriculture accounted  for
over 50 percent of GDP. Average illiteracy rates were in excess of 70 percent, and over three-
quarters for the Albanian population,  which is the predominant  ethnic group in Kosovo'. Even as
recent as 1988, although industry and mining comprised nearly half of the total national product
with agriculture down to 20 percent,  output per head in Kosovo was only 28 percent that of the
SFRY (World Bank, 2001).  Health care statistics with the exception of life expectancy were also
among the lowest in Europe (World Bank, 2001b).
During the period of relative  autonomy and increased access to Albanian language
education from 1975, Kosovo made large advances in the area of education.  There is evidence
that, in the ten years beginning in 1968, the proportion of Kosovar Albanians in the education
system increased from 38 to 72 percent.  Moreover,  illiteracy dropped to below 10 percent
(Malcolm,  1998). The suspension of autonomy in Kosovo in 1989 brought an end to these
improvements in the education sector.  The consequential imposition of the Federalist
government's control on the governance and curriculum of the education system resulted in a
majority of the Kosovar Albanians leaving the formal education system instead enrolling into the
"parallel  education system" from  1991.
The 1999 conflict between the Serbs and Albanians further affected the living standards
of the population. Industrial output collapsed,  agricultural activities came to a halt and livestock
' Individuals of Albanian and Serb etmnicity make up a majority of Kosovo's population with Albanians comprising
90 percent of the population (UNHCR, 2000).  Other minority groups include Roma, Turks and other Slavic groups.
1was decimated.  As civilian communities were the targets of the violence, the damage to private
housing, education and health facilities and other infrastructure  was severe. In addition, the
conflict resulted in a massive movement of about half a million people within the country and
about 800,000 persons or 37 percent of the population to neighboring countries (UNHCR, 2000).
The political and economic changes in Kosovo over the past decades demands a closer
look at their impact on the enrollment and education levels of different cohorts of  Kosovars.
Currently, Kosovo is in a process of transition from emergency relief to long-term economic
development.  Thanks to massive donor assistance,.domestic  savings and inflows of diaspora
funds, the entrepreneurial  spirit of the  1980s is reviving, repairs to housing and infrastructure are
under way and agricultural activities have begun  again. Many Albanians are now coming back
after spending a variable period abroad2. The focus is increasingly on development needs and
opportunities in Kosovo.  The large role of education and human capital characteristics  of
individuals in this process of economic growth and development is well established (see
Easterlin,  1981; Becker, Murphy and Tamura,  1993 for example). Therefore, we expect that in
Kosovo as well, the skills of the population are likely to be a critical  factor in this development.
It is therefore essential at this stage
*  to assess the impact of the last decade on the skill level of  the population,
*  to identify the mechanisms behind the process and
*  to use these diagnostics to inform the current policy debate leading to the reconstruction
of a multiethnic education system in Kosovo.
2 There is also evidence that more than 100,000 Serbs and Romas fled from Kosovo at the end of the crisis
(UNHCR,  1999).
2This paper attempts to contribute to this assessment by identifying the main sources of
any existing differences in educational attainment between two different cohorts of Kosovar
youth. Given the nearly universal enrolment rates in primary education, we emphasize on
enrolment in secondary education and maximum grade achieved. The paper exploits differences
in exposure to the ethnically segmented education system of two cohorts of Albanian Kosovars,
the main ethnic group affected by the political and economic changes in Kosovo in 19913 . The
older cohort aged 27-35  years in 2000 represents individuals who were enrolled in secondary
education before  1991. The second cohort aged  16-26 years includes individuals who entered
secondary school in the last ten years and have therefore spent all their education under the
ethnically segmented education system and during the recent conflict. We find important gender
differences in the way the last decade has affected their educational outcomes.
The paper begins by providing some background  information on the events leading to the
recent ethnic conflict and on the 'parallel'  system of education that was present in Kosovo in the
last decade. After examining the literature on the determinants  of education in developing
countries, we then describe the data, variable specification  and the methodology used for the
analysis. The basic results are then presented and the conclusions drawn.
3  We believe that the minority Serb population was not directly affected by these changes as state policies were
targeted to exclude the Albanians, therefore resulting in a parallel education system and the growth of an informal
economy.
32. Historical  Background  and the "Parallel"  Education System
The post-World War II history of Kosovo can be divided into five distinct periods:
*  the period from the creation of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) to the
federalist constitutional reforms of 1974;
*  the 'golden period' from  1975 to  1989, which saw increased  autonomy of the Kosovo region
and its ethnic minorities;
*  the decade beginning with 1989, the year when the autonomous provincial legislature was
superseded, decision making progressively transferred back to Belgrade, and the rights of the
ethnic minorities considerably limited;
*  the  1999 conflict, which in some areas started as early as the summer of 1997, and the
following reconstruction period;
*  the new challenging phase of peace and economic development.
The Events Leading to 1991
After a period of  relative autonomy within the Republic of Yugoslavia since the late
1940's, Kosovo's autonomy was suspended in 1989, years after the death of Tito (1980) and
increasing tensions between the local (Kosovo) and central (Belgrade) governments.  This
marked the beginning of a downward trend in the living standards of  the Kosovar population as a
whole and of the Albanian Kosovars in particular. In the first half of the  1990s, GDP contracted
by 50 percent, to less than US$400 per head (World Bank, 2001a).
The suspension of autonomy was accompanied by legal measures intended to reverse the
significant Serbian emigration from Kosovo and by administrative  actions to put the public
sector in Serbian hands. While the guidelines were established in March 1990, the specific
4actions were later described in the "Temporary Measures" in July 1990. The temporary measures
indicated actions to be taken across the public sector administration in Kosovo, including staffing
decisions and establishing Serb as the only official language. On the political front, government
institutions such as the Parliament and Municipal Assemblies were suspended or not allowed to
meet. These actions had a direct impact on the coverage and quality of public services in Kosovo
in general and of those offered to the Albanian population in particular. Many Albanians were
forced to migrate abroad as a result of political and economic discrimination.  In addition, the
majority of Kosovar Albanian students who remained in Kosovo left the formal educational
system following the restriction on the use of the Albanian language at school, in 1991-92. This
marked the beginning of the overcrowded  and under-resourced  'parallel'  system of education.
The Box below summarizes the major events leading to the creation of the parallel
system.
Major events  in the creation of the parallel system in Kosovo
1974  Constitution of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Recognized the existence of
different nations  (Serbia,  Croatia, Bosnia, Slovenia,  Montenegro,  Macedonia) and
nationalities  (Kosovo Albanians and Hungarians) within the FRY.
1989  Suspension of Kosovo Autonomy (February).
1990  - Programme for Attainment of Peace. Freedom and Prosperity in the Socialist
Autonomous  Province of Kosovo approved by the Serbian Parliament (March).
- Temporary  measures on Kosovo (July), officially named Law on the Activities of
Organs of the Republic in Exceptional  Circumstances,  approved by the Serbian
Parliament.  It mainly specified incentives to increase  Serb demographic participation,
and facilitated the dismissal  or replacement of Albanian public servants.
- Constitutional Declaration(July  5h). The Albanian dominated Kosovo Assembly gives
Kosovo nation status.
- Kacanik's Constitution (September).  Kosovar Albanians declared independence  and a
parliamentary government.
1991  Referendum for Independence of Kosovo by the Albanians.
1992  Presidential and Parliamentary elections  in Kosovo by the Albanians.  Rugova elected
but not recognized by Yugoslavia or other countries.The 'Parallel'  Education  System
The effects of the "Temporary Measures" imposed in 1990 were directly observed in the
delivery of education.  In order to advance the interests of one group (the Serbs), at the expense
of the other (Albanians),  a segregated  education system was established (Bush and Saltarelli,
2000; UNHCR, 2000). Schools and faculties in Albanian language were closed, a unified Serb-
oriented curriculum was established, Albanian teachers were dismissed and separate shifts for
Albanian and Serb students were imposed in some schools.
In the midst of these changes, the Kosovar Albanian population supported the functioning
of a parallel administrative system to guarantee the delivery of public services to the Kosovar
Albanian population. While students at the primary level were still able to use the same schools
in different shifts, most Kosovar-Albanian  students at the secondary level received classes
outside school facilities and often in private homes.  Secondary education was directly affected
by the lack of infrastructure and human resources in education.  The system was funded by
contributions  from the Albanian population through a parallel income and cadastral tax  system4.
Additional sources of funding for these programs included direct contributions and donations
from organizations and households (RIINVEST, 2000).  It is reported that more than  1,400
houses were used as centers of education without compensation  to the families. Despite the effort
to fund the education  system in this manner, the availability of educational inputs declined
significantly,  and teachers were unable to update their teaching skills and methodologies.
4 A 3 percent tax rate on net income is widely recognized. The parallel tax collection agencies charged between 2
and 4 percent over the total collection (RIINVEST, 2000).
6In summary, the parallel  system represented a separate education system for the Kosovar-
Albanian population, which directly reduced the access, resources and utilization of education
services, particularly at the secondary school level.
Identifying  Those Affected  by the Parallel System
Children in Kosovo enter formal education at the age of 6 or 7 years and spend 8 years in
primary school.  At age 14 or 15 years, they choose between enrolling into a general secondary
school -- high school -- or a technical  school.  Successful completion of three to four years in a
general secondary school allows access to university education while students of technical
schools graduate after a period of two to three years. In order to identify the effects on the
parallel system in secondary education, this paper distinguishes those individuals  that -- because
of  their age -- partially or fully faced a parallel system in secondary education,  from those that
were not exposed to the system.
Kosovo's  Education System
Age  group  Grades  Level
0-5  Preschool
6-14  1-8  Primary
15-18  9-12/13  High school
15-17  9-10/11  Technical
4 years  Professional
Source:  World Bank (2001c) Kosovo Poverty Assessment Report. The World Bank.
The first group is comprised of individuals aged  17 years and over in 1990 (27 years and
over in 2000). This cohort of individuals had already enrolled into secondary education before
1990 and consequently was not exposed to the parallel regime. A student enrolled in secondary
education at age 17 would have typically already made the decision to enroll into secondary
7education.  Thus, they are considered as not exposed to the parallel  system or as having limited
exposure to the parallel  system. This defines Cohort 1.
Cohort  2 is defined as those individuals who faced the decision to enroll in or continue in
secondary education under the parallel regime. An individual aged  16 years in 1990 (or aged 26
years in 2000) was either entering the first or second year of secondary education. At this time,
those students (or their families) were making the decision to participate in the parallel  system
for most of their secondary education.  Thus, those individuals aged 16 years of age or less in
1990 (or 26 years or less in 2000) were fully or substantially exposed to the parallel  system. (see
Box below).
Cohorts affected by the Parallel  System in Secondary  Education
Political  - i
and other  O
events
0~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Dates  ~~~~~July,  Sept.  19 Dates.  1989  1990  1990  1999
Education  Unified  Parallel
system  ____________________
Cohorts  Cohort 1  Cohort 2
No exposure  Significant or fill exposure
Exposure  (aged 17 or more in 1990)  (aged  16 or  less in September 1990)
Age
groups in  27-35  16-26
2000  ___
Note: The Kosovo Living Standards and Measurement  Survey was carried out during the Fall
(September-November)  2000.
8In this paper, we exploit the difference in exposure to the parallel system to identify the
impact of such arrangement on educational indicators for secondary education (enrollment, drop
out or continuation in secondary school) of Kosovar Albanians after controlling for other
individual and household characteristics.
3. Determinants  of Education
Education outcomes are typically influenced by individual, household and conmmunity
characteristics.  Human capital theory treats education as the means to increase an individual's
economic position (Becker,  1993; Schultz, 1998 for example). As a result, returns to investments
in education act as one of the most important determinants of education.  However, its role is not
consistent across all developing countries.  Although a year of schooling increases earnings by
about 10 percent on average, this is not necessarily true in centrally planned and transition
economies where other factors such as political connections are at play (Moock, Patrinos and
Venkataraman,  1998; Psacharapoulos,  1994).  Moreover returns are higher for wage employees
as compared to those employed in the informal sector or in agriculture (Mason and Khandker,
1996).  We expect this to be the case in Kosovo as well, especially in the 1990s.  Although there
is limited data on Kosovo to measure returns to schooling during this period, based on the
ethnically segregated political and economic system, there is reason to believe that returns to
schooling are low, particularly among Albanians.  However, it is also likely that Albanians were
motivated to achieve higher education through the parallel system as a means to attain vocational
skills to counter the constraints posed by the Serb dominated economy.
The role of social factors and household influences on education has also been well
described in the literature, especially in analyses of gender differences  in education (King and
9Hill, 1993). Wealth gaps in education have also been observed across developing countries
(Deolalikar,  1997; Filmer, 1999).  The higher the economic position of the household, the higher
the school attainment is. Moreover, the household's  economic position could also affect the role
played by other household and community characteristics  on school enrollment (Deolalikar,
1997). Richer households are in a better position to finance children's education both directly
and in terms of the opportunity cost of children's time derived from labor force participation.
This is more of an issue when we take into account the family size including the number of
children in the household often resulting in differential education outcomes for male and female
children. It has been shown that various measures of education are usually negatively associated
with number of siblings (Lloyd,  1994 for example).
Similarly, social norms are just as important. In some societies, social norms may limit
female education such that parents may choose in favor of son's schooling as compared to
educating their daughters. However, parents' education (especially of mothers) encourages
children's enrollment and education in most developing countries (Filmer,  1999).  This effect of
female education on primary enrollment is strongest among households falling in the poorest
quintiles in developing countries (Deolalikar,  1997).
4. Data  and Variable  Definition
This analysis uses data from the new Living Standard Measurement  Survey (LSMS) for
Kosovo collected by the World Bank (World Bank, 2001b)5. The Kosovo LSMS is a household
survey, which was administered to 2,880 households (2,400 Albanian and 480 Serbs) randomly
5  For more information on the Kosovo LSMS, see http:H/www.worldbank.org/Isms/guide/select.html
10selected from the Albanian and Serbian population of Kosovo, respectively.  It comprises a
community questionnaire  as well as a household questionnaire designed to provide the necessary
empirical base line for the future economic development of Kosovo and designing its poverty
reduction strategy. As such,  it includes detailed information on individual, household and
community characteristics collected over a period of three months-between  September  and
December 2000.  This analysis focuses on the education module of the household questionnaire.
We use two dependent variables to measure education. The first dependent variable of
interest is enrollment in secondary education, a variable that takes the value of one if the
individual has ever been enrolled in secondary education and zero otherwise. The sample is
restricted to individuals who finished primary education (completed grade 8). The second
dependent variable in the next part of the analysis is the highest grade achieved by those that
have enrolled in secondary education. Our sample includes Kosovar Albanians  and Serbs aged
16-35 years.  We perform the analysis separately on the two cohorts of Albanians as we expect
the political and economic changes to have a significant impact on their education patterns.  The
entire Serb sample is analyzed using a dummy variable to identify the two cohorts.  We do this
for two reasons.  First, given the size of the Serb sample, it is not practical to analyze the two
cohorts separately.  Second, we don't expect the change in the education  system to have affected
the Serbs much, so we treat them only as a comparison group.
Other literature  emphasizes the importance of household wealth in determining education
outcomes (Deolalikar,  1997).  Given the lack of a retrospective history of incomes, and the
substantial changes observed in the last years, we use an asset-based measure to identify
potential income effects.  If durable goods reflect previous incomes, the value of durables in a
11household would be a good measure of long-term income of the household.  The value of:
durables owned by the household for at least 5 years avoids including the value of the large
inflow of humanitarian aid and cash from returning migrants after the recent conflict. Other
variables included are education of the father as another proxy for the socio-economic  status of
the household, the location at birth (urban/rural  and within Yugoslavia or abroad), the area of
administrative responsibility, and a dummy for other ethnic groups.  We expect education
paftems or expectations to be higher for Kosovars born in urban areas or outside Yugoslavia.
Despite their importance  in explaining human capital outcomes, demographic  and other
household characteristics  are not used as regressors for two main reasons.  First, there are
difficulties in retroactively reconstructing  the characteristics of households that the individual
lived in at the time the decision to enroll or not in secondary education was taken. Using recent
information on the household where the individual currently lives is not appropriate  since
individuals may be living in a separate household (because of marriage,  for example) and more
importantly, because of the drastic demographic changes during the war.  Second, this analysis
focuses more on the differentials in education outcomes rather than its determinants.  We
therefore believe that including these characteristics in the analysis is not critical to the analysis.
The definition of the explanatory variables is provided in Table Al in the appendix.
5. Methodology
Figures la and lb present the educational profile of  males and females from the two
Kosovar Albanian cohorts described earlier in the paper.  It also includes the profile for the Serb
sample as a comparison group.  It is clear from the graph that enrolment in primary education is
close to universal for both ethnic groups and dropouts from primary education are fairly rare. As
12a result, completion rates for primary education are high. However a relatively small proportion
of those completing primary school progress into secondary education.  The drop is particularly
significant for women.
The empirical trends in Figures la and lb provide the rationale for focusing on secondary
education.  Reflecting the drop shown by the curve after primary education just before year 9, the
analysis is separated in two stages. The decision to enroll in secondary education is first
modeled. Then, the focus shifts to the duration of the educational spell for those who have
enrolled in secondary education - grade 9. Graphically,  this involves focusing on the gentle
decline experienced  in the empirical survival function for periods after Year 8. This decline is
amplified in Figures Al  and A2 in the Appendix.
Modeling the Enrollment in Secondary Education
The enrollment decision is estimated using a standard Probit model. In this context, the
probability of enrolling is a latent variable, E1j,  that is a function of household (Hj) and
individual  (Iij)  characteristics.  For individual i in householdj, we cannot observe the latent
variable Ej* but only the outcome of such decision, Eij = 1  {Ejj  > O}. We only observe the
outcome determined linearly by the characteristics above and unobserved components,  ujj.
Collapsing all characteristics into Xij = 1 { Hj Iij } the model is
Eij = I {X1jg  +  u1 j > O}  (1)
Given the evolution of the ethnic conflict in Kosovo, we estimate its effects in a variety
of ways. We begin by focusing on the two specific groups of Kosovar Albanians.
13*  those taking the decision whether or not to enter secondary education in 1991, the time
of the split between the Serbian dominated education system and the 'parallel'  system,
and
*  those who have entered secondary education in September 1999, the year immediately
after the conflict.
At the time of the survey, these individuals were aged 24 and  16 years respectively.  We
quantify the effect of ethnic conflict on these two groups of individuals by introducing a shift
variable for individuals born in these two years6.
We then move on to estimate the effect of the exposure to the parallel system on the
educational outcome of the young Kosovars Albanians by estimating equation (1) separately for
the two cohorts (c=1,2)  corresponding to those exposed to the parallel system and those not
exposed. The complete model to be estimated is therefore
E=c  1  {I  Xic3c +Age16a1 +Age24a2 +  uijc> 0 }, c = 1,2  (2)
The parallel  system is assumed to have affected the linkages between educational
determinants and the outcome itself. For example,  the effect of parents'  education on secondary
enrollment must have changed because of the restrictions imposed on the enrollment in
secondary education for the Kosovar-Albanians.  Given the same parents' education, some
students were not able to enroll because of the changes introduced by the parallel system.  In this
sense, the changes in the model parameters,  Sc,  represent the changes due to the parallel system.
6 Since the change in education systems did not affect the Serbs, we observe the impact of conflict on these groups
of Albanians only.
14A single analysis  for the Serbs, the comparison group, covers individuals in both cohorts with a
dummy variable identifying the two cohorts.
The estimated models provide the setting for describing counterfactual  outcomes. The
main objective is to compare expected enrolment rates for the exposed cohort under the
conditions (parameters)  of the unexposed cohort.  This way, we estimate the enrollment rate if
those aged 16-26 years were living under the conditions of those aged 27-35 years. Formally,
this implies comparing E[Eij'  I  Xjl, (1] = E[ P {Xjl,3l  + uijl >0}  with E[Ejj  I  Xj14,  (2]  = E[ P{XQjl#2
+ u1il >0}. For example, we estimate the enrollment equation (2) for the cohort aged 27-35 years
(not exposed) and using these parameters, we predict the enrollment of the cohort aged 16-26
years.
Survival in Secondary and Higher  Education
Once individuals are enrolled in secondary education (grade  9th), their performance
throughout secondary education and higher education is modeled as a survival model where
educational  attainment (years of education) is the duration of interest.
The strategy actually mimics that described earlier in the paper, but a number of technical
differences  are worth noting. First, survival models connect the drop out (or hazard) rate at each
education level (year) to observed characteristics of the individual and the household. For each
Albanian cohort, c=1,2, we have:
h jc (t) = hc (XijC, Age 1 6  a,  Age 24a 2,  (3)
Estimating hc(.) requires  imposing some assumption about the distribution of the
unobserved variables. Choosing the appropriate hazard function (or its corresponding  survival
one) is driven by the features observed in the empirical survival (or hazard)  function. The
15empirical survival functions indicate that after enrollment in secondary education  (9th grade), a
peak in dropout rates is observed in grade  12, when a number of individuals finish vocational or
technical secondary education.  This increase in the hazard rate is better captured by a lognormal
distribution. This specification of the hazard function is favored over the commonly used
proportional hazard model (PHM) because we suspect that dramatic differences experienced in
Kosovo over the last decade may have also changed the shape of  the survival function itself,
including the autonomous component.  In such a case, comparing the survival rates emerging
from a proportional hazard model across cohorts would impose over-restrictive assumptions
about the changes in hoc(t). Using a non-proportional  model (such as the lognormal one), we do
not impose such restrictions on the survival functions.
Following a similar reasoning, we compare the hazard rate for each individual in the
affected cohort, h (Xj1,  3'), with the expected survival rate if those individuals, Xjl, were
responding in the unaffected scenario,  h(X4',  ,B2).  The difference h (Xjl,  31)-  h(X4l,  (32) is
interpreted  as the impact of the parallel system. Again, these models are run separately for each
of the two Albanian cohorts using the Serb population as a comparison  group.
6. Results of the Regression Analysis
This section presents the results of the estimation of the probit model for the probability
of enrolling in secondary education and the duration model for the length of the education spell.
The results are presented for males and females separately since structural differences between
these two groups appear to exist amongst the Albanians. For each of the tables, the first three
columns refer to our first cohort of Albanians, males aged 16 to 26 years at the time of the
survey. Columns 4 to 6 refer to the older cohort of Albanians,  aged 27-35 years. For comparison,
16the last three columns present results for a single sample of Serbs that includes both males and
females. As mentioned earlier, the main rationale for polling the Serb sample together is the
small size of the sub-samples. However, it also reflects the results of standard tests on the
structural stability of the sample, which reject the hypothesis of structural differences  in the
regression coefficients between the two.  age cohorts of Serbs and between males and females.
Tables la and lb present the results of the Probit equation that estimates the probability
of enrolling into secondary education for three samples of males and females respectively, that
have completed secondary  education.  Unsurprisingly, the probability of enrolment into
secondary education increases with father's education for both cohorts of Albanian  as well as for
the Serbs. In addition, the value of the durables owned by the household and having been born in
an urban area increases significantly the probability of enrolment for the older cohort of
Albanians as well as for the Serbs. Finally, living in the areas of responsibility of the Germans  or
the USA has a significant negative effect for both cohorts of Albanians while individuals  from
ethnic minorities  living in Serbian areas have a significantly lower probability of enrolling into
secondary education.
Interestingly, the effect of the value of the durables becomes insignificant for the
Albanian girls while there is an increase  in the role of father's education and having been born in
an urban area. This points to the relative importance of cultural and social factors that act as
barriers to entry to education as opposed to financial constraints.
Father's education is also an important determinant of the grade achieved for those who
enroll in secondary education, independently of their ethnic origin and gender (Tables 2a and
2b). This effect is stronger for the younger cohort of Albanian and the Serbs. Having been born
17in an urban area also has a positive effect on the grade achieved for the Albanians. However,  this
effect is not significant for the youngest cohort of girls. Finally, it is important to note that the
value of the durables owned by the household seems to affect the probability of enrolment but
not the length of stay in education for the Albanians. It however maintains its positive effect for
the Serb sample. It is also interesting to note the positive and significant  coefficient of the
dummy for ethnic minority within the Serb sample, which suggests that, although their
probability to enroll is lower, the expected stay for the members of the minority groups that
enroll is higher. One should however be warned about reading too much into this result by the
heterogeneity of the ethnic minority group.
The insignificant coefficient amongst the Serbs of the female dummy and of the dummy
indicating the older cohort in the Probit model (Table la and lb) suggests that there are no
significant age or gender differences in the probability of enrolment in secondary education
amongst the Serbs. However,  on average, the older cohort is expected to achieve a higher grade
than the younger cohort.
Measuring  the Effects of  Ethnic Tension and Conflict
The significant positive coefficient of the age 24 dummy variable suggests that the
introduction of an Albanian education system significantly increased the enrolment of Albanian
boys into secondary education but had no significant effect on girls. By way of contrast, the end
of  the conflict appears  to have resulted into a significant increase in the probability of enrolment
into secondary education for both boys and girls but with a considerably higher effect on girls.
We then move on to estimate the effect of the exposure to the parallel  system on the
educational outcomes of the young Kosovars.  We do this by comparing the predicted probability
18of enrolment and the expected length of the educational  spell for the younger cohort with what
they would have had, given their characteristics,  had they been educated under the old system.
Figure 2 reports the expected  enrolment probabilities for the two Albanian cohorts and
the simulated probability for the younger cohort had it been educated under the old system. The
graph shows that, with an enrolment probability of 76 percent, young males from the younger
cohort are less likely to be enrolled into secondary education than their counterfactual cohort -
81 percent. In addition, it tells us that the decline is entirely due to differences in the system.
Indeed, the younger cohort is endowed with better characteristics  than the old one and, had the
change in parameters not occurred, they would have experienced better enrolment than their
older counterparts (85  percent). For young women, the situation is rather different. The
probability of enrolment for younger women is nine percentage points higher than for their older
counterparts  and this difference is only partially explained by the increase in the endowment (4
percentage points). The main source of the increase is in the estimated parameters,  showing that
the parallel system has acted as an incentive for girls to participate in education beyond primary
education. Table 3 shows that the values of the estimated probabilities and the confidence
intervals around those values.  The latter show that the inter-cohort  differences are statistically
significant.
Figure 3 shows the effects of the parallel system on the expected  years of education for
the younger individuals that enrolled in secondary school.  The results are striking. The events of
the last decade have reduced the expected years of education for the Albanian population of both
genders. This is despite a slight improvement in the characteristics of the individuals in the two
cohorts. Table 4 shows that the expected values are statistically different from one another.
197. Conclusions
The educational system maintained by the Albanians in the last decade has been praised
by many as being rather successful in maintaining adequate standards of education for the
Albanian population under conditions of ethnic conflict.
Our results suggest that, while this may indeed have been the case, the last decade of
ethnic tension has nevertheless claimed a substantial toll on the educational  outcomes of the
Albanian Kosovars. This is particularly true of the young males who have seen their enrolment
rates in secondary education reduced by nearly 10 percentage points and on average - if enrolled
- are expected to complete one less year in education.  The parallel system appears to have been
successful in protecting, and indeed encouraging, secondary school enrolment for girls but at the
expense of a sharp decline in the expected numbers of years completed (1.3).
Finally in the context of widespread ethnic conflict the introduction of an Albanian
parallel system in 1991 on the one hand and the UN intervention in 1999 on the other, appear to
have been seen as stabilizing factors by the Albanian population.  Soon after these two events,
enrolment in secondary education increased significantly for men and for the youngest women in
the sample. Moreover, the effect appears to have continued beyond the short-term. Having
entered secondary education just after the beginning of the parallel system has a significant
positive effect on the expected number of years completed.
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24Table l a:  Probit results of the probability of enrollment into Secondary Education: Albanian Males in comparison with Serbs
Albanian Males: Age  16-26  Albanian Males: Age 27-35  Serb Males & Females:Age:16-35
Coefficient  Z  Mean  Coefficient  Z  Mean  Coefficient  Z  Mean
Age is  16years  0.585  3.381  0.114
Age is 24 years  0.362  2.191  0.097  - - -
Age is 27-35 years  - - - -0.113  -0.558  0.331
Females  - - - - - - -0.216  -1.083  0.524
Serbs and others  -0.053  -0.251  0.044  0.125  0.366  0.048  -1.400  -1.998  0.008
Born  in Urban areas  0.094  0.888  0.377  0.511  2.692  0.320  0.465  1.777  0.356
Born outside Former Yugoslavia  - -
Residence outside Former
Yugoslavia before conflict  -0.133  -0.408  0.019  0.021  0.058  0.050  - - -
Father's education (in  years)  0.120  9.098  10.445  0.089  3.803  8.880  0.084  3.179  10.703
Value of Household  durables
over 5 years old (log)  0.073  2.034  6.498  -0.039  -0.621  6.951  0.321  2.863  7.236
Area of Responsibility
France  -0.317  -1.967  0.119  -0.419  -1.314  0.093  -0.214  -0.791  0.517
Germany  -0.998  -7.171  0.208  -1.165  4.773  0.224  - - -
Italy  -0.245  -1.605  0.158  -0.949  -3.571  0.147  - - -
USA  -0.378  -2.693  0.204  -0.703  -2.853  0.212  -0.417  -1.466  0.234
Constant  -0.644  -2.421  0.997  2.053  -1.330  -1.458
N  1048  424  454
Log likelihood  -474.734  -171.615  -98.452
Pseudo R square  0.178  0.155  0.195
Note: The variable "Serbs  and others"  is modified to "Albanians and others"  in the Serb model.
25Table l b: Probit results of the probability of enrollment into Secondary Education: Albanian Females in comparison with Serbs
Albanian Females: Age 16-26  Albanian Females: Age 27-35  Serb Males & Females:Age:16-35
Coefficient  Z  Mean  Coefficient  Z  Mean  Coefficient  Z  Mean
Age is 16 years  0.976  6.418  0.106
Age  is 24 years  0.072  0.513  0.097  - - -
Age is 27-35 years  - -0.113  -0.558  0.331
Females  - -0.216  -1.083  0.524
Serbs and others  -0.009  -0.041  0.045  0.234  0.920  0.054  -1.400  -1.998  0.008
Bom  in Urban  areas  1.036  11.466  0.389  0.885  7.567  0.294  0.465  1.777  0.356
Born  outside Former Yugoslavia  0.538  0.639  0.003  -0.059  -0.125  0.017  - - -
Residence outside Former
Yugoslavia before conflict-  - - - 0.202  0.588  0.025  - - -
Father's  education (in years)  0.076  6.298  10.485  0.022  1.517  10.167  0.084  3.179  10.703
Value of Household durables
over 5 years old (log)  0.030  0.888  6.551  -0.038  -0.879  6.798  0.321  2.863  7.236
Area of Responsibility
France  -0.460  -3.176  0.114  -0.232  -1.235  0.098  -0.214  -0.791  0.517
Germany  -0.784  -6.048  0.204  -0.823  -5.293  0.246  - - -
Italy  -0.557  -4.239  0.165  -0.281  -1.733  0.159  - - -
USA  -0.353  -2.937  0.218  -0.366  -2.387  0.203  -0.417  -1.466  0.234
Constant  -1.038  -4.113  -0.151  -0.469  -1.330  -1.458
N  1108  642  454
Log likelihood  -596.850  -383.129  -98.452
Pseudo R square  0.222  0.117  0.195
Note: The variable "Serbs  and others"  is modified to "Albanians and others" in the Serb model.
26Table 2a: Log-normal  Hazard  Model for Duration  of Education:  Albanian Males in comparison with Serbs
Albanian Males:  Age 16-26  Albanian Males: Age 27-35  Serb Males & Females:Age:16-35
Coefficient  Z  Mean  Coefficient  Z  Mean  Coefficient  Z  Mean
Age is 16 years  -0.263  -20.867  0.133
Age is 24 years  0.048  3.451  0.102  - -
Age is 27-35 years  - - 0.074  5.104  0.329
Females  - - - - - 0.013  0.967  0.517
Serbs and others  0.016  0.615  0.029  -0.030  -0.863  0.038  0.414  2.577  0.002
Born in Urban areas  0.015  1.750  0.419  0.024  1.714  0.357  -0.020  -1.271  0.369
Born outside  Former Yugoslavia  0.181  2.162  0.003  - - 0.000  -0.118  -1.461  0.010
Residence outside Former
Yugoslavia before conflict  -0.007  -0.248  0.019  -0.029  -0.970  0.049  - - -
Fathers education  (in years)  0.003  2.286  11.183  0.003  1.776  9.310  0.004  2.079  10.971
Value of Household durables
over 5 years old (log)  0.000  -0.130  6.526  -0.003  -0.552  6.944  0.018  2.204  7.286
Area of Responsibility
France  -0.028  -2.155  0.122  -0.082  -3.862  0.099  -0.009  -0.529  0.515
Germany  -0.028  -1.920  0.148  -0.050  -2.402  0.184  -0.226  -3.502  0.004
Italy  -0.029  -2.219  0.169  -0.033  -1.538  0.138  -0.002  -0.027  0.012
USA  -0.003  -0.240  0.204  -0.048  -2.388  0.200  0.011  0.540  0.215
Constant  2.453  97.105  - 2.566  63.212  - 2.292  34.911  -
N  793  337  430
Log likelihood  583.885  239.323  241.874
Note: The variable "Serbs  and others"  is modified to "Albanians  and others"  in the Serb model.
27Table 2b: Log-normal Hazard Model for Duration of Education: Albanian Females in comparison with Serbs
Albanian Females:  Age 16-26  Albanian Females: Age 27-35  Serb Males & Females:Age:16-35
Coefficient  Z  Mean  Coefficient  Z  Mean  Coefficient  Z  Mean
Age  is 16 years  -0.261  -17.109  0.157
Age is 24 years  0.071  3.763  0.098  - - -
Age is 27-35 years  - - - 0.074  5.104  0.329
Females  - - - - - - 0.013  0.967  0.517
Serbs and others  -0.010  -0.316  0.024  -0.042  -1.010  0.045  0.414  2.577  0.002
Bom in Urban areas  0.001  0.102  0.594  0.034  2.007  0.495  -0.020  -1.271  0.369
Bom outside Former Yugoslavia  0.062  0.853  0.011  0.007  0.115  0.020  -0.118  -1.461  0.054
Residence outside Former
Yugoslavia before conflict  -0.013  -0.231  0.016  -0.007  -0.145  0.034  - - -
Father's education (in years)  0.004  2.216  11.876  0.003  1.403  11.053  0.004  2.079  10.971
Value of Household durables
over 5 years old (log)  0.004  0.990  6.699  0.011  1.538  6.852  0.018  2.204  7.286
Area of Responsibility
France  -0.023  -1.349  0.103  -0.098  -3.669  0.087  -0.009  -0.529  0.515
Germany  -0.007  -0.390  0.137  -0.055  -2.006  0.139  -0.226  -3.502  0.004
Italy  0.003  0.181  0.146  -0.057  -2.340  0.184  -0.002  -0.027  0.012
USA  -0.021  -1.292  0.211  -0.051  -2.054  0.195  0.011  0.540  0.215
Constant  2.414  65.817  2.467  46.325  2.292  34.911
N  537  249  430
Log likelihood  362.041  164.293  241.874
Note: The variable "Serbs and others'  is modified to "AJbanians and others"  in the Serb model.
28Table 3:  Expected probability of enrollment into Secondary Education: Albanian Males and Females
Males  Females
Exp. Prob. of  Confidence  % Enrolled in  Exp.  Prob. of  Confidence  % Enrolled in
Sec. Enrollment  Interval  Sec. Educ.  Sec. Enrollment  Interval  Sec. Educ.
Cohort aged  16-26  0.76  (0.75, 0.77)  75.99  0.52  (0.51,  0.54)  52.04
Cohort aged 27-35  0.82  (0.80,  0.83)  81.50  0.41  (0.39,  0.42)  40.66
Counterfactual
cohort aged 16-26  0.85  (0.84, 0.86)  0.45  (0.44, 0.47)
Table 4: Expected Years of Education:Albanian  Males and Females
Males  Females
Expected  Yrs.  Confidence  Avg. Years  Expected Yrs.  Confidence  Avg. Years
of Education  Interval  of Education  of Education  Interval  of Education
Cohort aged 16-26  11.58  (11.51,  11.65)  11.68  11.62  (11.53,11.71  11.74
C6hdrt aged 27-35  12.80  (12.75,  12.85)  12.91  12.91  (12.84,12.98  13.02
Counterfactual
cohort aged  16-26  12.91  (12.88,  12.94)  12.97  (12.93,  13.02)
29Appendix
Table Al: Description of Variables
Dependent Variables
1 if currently enrolled in Secondary Education,  0
otherwise.  (Sample is composed of those who completed
Enrolled in Secondary Education  Primary Education- Grade  8)
Continuous variable in years. (Sample is composed by
Highest grade completed  those who enrolled in Secondary Education).
Individual Level Variables
Age is 16 years  1 if age is 16 years, 0 otherwise
ge is 24 years  1 if age is 24 years, 0 otherwise
Age is 27-35 years  1 if age is 27-35 years, 0 otherwise
Female  1 if female, 0 otherwise
Serbs and others  1 if ethnic group is Serb or other minorities, 0 otherwise
1 if ethnic group is Albanian or other minorities, 0
Albanians  and others  otherwise
Born in Urban  area  1 if born in urban area, 0 otherwise
Born outside Former Yugoslavia  1 if born outside Kosovo/Former Yugoslavia/Serbs,  0
(Serbs)  otherwise
Born outside Former Yugoslavia  1 if  born outside Kosovo/Former Yugoslavia, 0 otherwise
(Albanians)
Residence outside Former  1 if residence before 1999 conflict was outside
Yugoslavia  before conflict  Kosovo/Former Yugoslavia/Serbia,  0 otherwise
(Serbs)
Residence outside Former  1 if  residence before 1999 conflict was outside
Yugoslavia  before conflict  Kosovo/Former Yugoslavia,  0 otherwise
(Albanians)
Household  Level  Variables
Continuous variable in years. Based on Father's
education if father resides in household. If father does not
reside in the household, based on education of male head
Father's education (in years)  of household else missing.




France  1 if AOR is of France, 0 otherwise
Germany  1 if AOR is of Germany, 0 otherwise
Italy  1 if AOR is of Italy, 0 otherwise
USA  1 if AOR is of USA, 0 otherwise
UK (Omitted category)  1 if AOR is of UK, 0 otherwise
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